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I. INTRODUCTION
At a time long after clogged civil dockets and fears of foreign judicial
systems first pushed international commercial disputants towards
arbitration as a primary method of conflict resolution, it is now worthwhile
to consider carefully any procedural mechanism designed to promote the
central aims of this alternative to litigation. One central aim is to provide
swift, sure, and settled decision-making, particularly in those numerous
cases in which malingering might lead to the ruin of one or both parties.
To this end, the traditional doctrines of preclusion-namely, res judicata
and collateral estoppel'-provide an attractive force with which to buttress
the conclusive nature of arbitral awards.
Unfortunately, for a couple of reasons, one cannot simply
import-without at least some reflection and adjustment-preclusionary
devices from litigation into arbitration. First, simply stated, arbitration is
not litigation: for example, procedures may vary from one arbitration to
the next, strict fidelity to the law is not required in arbitration, and the
basis of an award may be relatively obscure.2 Thus, it may be difficult to
1. The Court in Lawlor v. Nat ' Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) stated:
[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment 'on the merits' in a prior suit
involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same
cauie of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, such
ajudgment precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the
prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of action as the
second suit.
2. See Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, 333 F.3d 42, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that
"[a]rbitrators need not explain the reasons for their award"), aff'd, 411 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2005);
Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1137 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
district court must consider the procedural differences between arbitration and court proceedings
in assessing prejudice on the part of party challenging use of collateral estoppel); Richard W.
Hulbert, Arbitral Procedures and the Preclusive Effect of Awards in International Commercial
Arbitration, 7 INT'LTAX & Bus. LAw. 156, 195 (1989) (examining whether the effect a U.S. court
gives to an international arbitral award should differ from the effect given to a judgment from a
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tell which claims and issues were, or could have been, fully and fairly
heard by the tribunal, the sine qua non of any definition of preclusion.
Second, the policy grounds from which res judicata and collateral estoppel
first sprung are not present in the arbitral arena, at least in the form of a
one-to-one correspondence.3 Neither of these reasons is enough, however,
to defeat all possibility of the preclusive effect of arbitral awards. A
number of cogent arguments can be advanced in favor of application, but
these arguments must necessarily be based on a theory that directly
addresses-rather than skirts-the obvious differences between arbitration
and litigation.
As a point of departure, it will prove helpful to pause and consider the
traditional policy justifications that militate in favor of preclusion in
litigation. Once this groundwork is established, the justifications vis-i-vis
commercial arbitration generally may be considered, then against
international arbitration specifically. This distinction between domestic
and international arbitration is important because there are a number of
special considerations in the international context that some courts and
commentators ignore when they take up the issue of preclusion. To
facilitate the flow of this analysis, the remainder of this Article is broken
into four major parts, three that develop a conceptual framework and
vocabulary, one that makes conclusions and recommendations. Part II,
which immediately follows this Introduction, examines the preclusion
rules as they evolved in the litigation context. Part III traces the various
ways that preclusion rules have been applied domestically when arbitration
is at issue either as the forum or the source of a prior decision. This section
establishes a rubric based on context that brings clarity to an area that is
often confused. Part IV maps the contextual rubric onto the international
context and considers whether international arbitral findings should bind
U.S. courts and subsequent arbitrations. The Article concludes with
suggestions for bringing both clarity and conformity to the question of
whether international arbitral awards should be binding in subsequent
proceedings.
U.S. court); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial
Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 663-64 (1988).
3. See Brodyv. Hankin, 299 F. Supp. 2d 454,459 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("Generally, resjudicata
rules must sometimes be adapted to fit the arbitration context.").
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II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN LITIGATION
In its most naked the form, the policy driving the twin doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel arises from the interimplication of notions
concerning fairness, certainty and judicial economy. The complexity of
modem society has only heightened our sense that disputes must be
resolved for all parties at one sitting:
New methods of marketing and transportation, contemporary
consumer concerns, and growing government contribute to the fact
that when injury occurs, or is thought to occur, there are multiple
victims, or multiple perpetrators, or both. And when those injuries
lead to litigation, they regularly yield multiple suits involving the
same issues.4
Thus, if each suit out of many is decided in isolation-i.e., if each is
handled as if its fellows did not exist-a duplicative burden on scarce
resources is an obvious and wasteful consequence.5 Even if some
observers have made too much of the dangers that multiple litigation
poses, the main point-namely, that economy, certainty, and finality all
suggest that a transaction and its central issues be heard only once-is well
taken. None of this is mere idle academic speculation, either; there is
adequate empirical evidence to suggest that courts favor preclusion as one
important tool for handling ever-increasing caseloads.'
4. See John C. McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707
(1976), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 243 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Jan Vetter
eds., 1987).
5. McCoid writes:
Either repetitive litigation requires the expenditure of additional resources on
adjudication, or, if expenditure remains constant, it diverts those resources from
resolution of other controversies of significance. That diversion may appear as
delay; or it may be a reduction of the time given to examination of any or all
controversies presented, with resulting loss of quality. Another product of
multiplicity is inconsistency. The spectre of public dismay over a system that
decides like cases differently is a disturbing one. Perhaps that concern is
overrated, but it is easy to see that different triers of law and fact, responding
perhaps to slightly different evidence or presentation at different times or places,
might well reach different judgments on the same transaction.
Id. at 243-44.
6. See Shell, supra note 2, at 626 (stating that wide use of arbitration has helped to ease
overloaded courts by funneling civil cases into alternative forums); RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 321 (1985).
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Of the two preclusionary doctrines, res judicata, or claim preclusion,
is the more general, referring to the practice of precluding the relitigation
of claims that either were or could have been brought in a prior
proceeding.7 Res judicata is itself further divided into two subcategories:
merger and bar. Merger, in its classic casebook manifestation, involves the
"splitting" of a claim. In Dearden v. Hey,' for example, the plaintiff
brought a tort action for personal injuries suffered in a car crash caused by
the defendant's negligence.9 However, the plaintiff had already sued and
recovered for property damages to his car arising from the same negligent
act." The court held "that damages resulting from a single tort, even
though such damages be partly property damages and partly personal
injury damages, are, when suffered by one person, the subject of only one
suit as against the wrongdoer."" This rule is based largely upon the
proposition that the defendant's wrongful act is single, that the cause of
action must be single, and that the different injuries occasioned by it are
merely items of damage proceeding from the same wrong.'
2
A plaintiff is thus encouraged to bring all claims arising from a single
transaction in a single proceeding because the final judgment will prevent
him from later raising issues and theories of recovery grounded on the
same transaction-even if he did not actually raise them. 3 In effect, the
original cause of action no longer exists; it is merged into the plaintiff's
7. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948):
The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final
judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies
are thereafter bound, not only as to every matter which was offered and received
to sustain the claim or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose.
Wolfv. Gruntal & Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 524, 527 (1st Cir. 1995) ('[Rjesjudicata (claim preclusion)
normally bars (i) relitigation of claims actually asserted in a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, and
(ii) litigation of claims that arose from the same set of operative facts and could have been raised
in the prior proceeding.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Brody, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 458 ("Res
judicata applies to all claims actually brought or which could have been brought in a prior action
regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding."). Many courts and
commentators employ the term "resjudicata" as a catch-all encompassing all forms of preclusion:
merger, bar and collateral estoppel. In this Article, I refer to this usage as "broad." The "narrow"
definition refers to merger and bar only.




12. Id. at 663.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 (1982).
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judgment, which itself becomes a new and wholly distinct cause of action
should the defendant fail to satisfy it.'4
Bar, which is almost-but not quite-a mirror image of merger, blocks
a plaintiff's attempt to relitigate a claim upon which the defendant has
already prevailed in a previous action. 5 The one significant point of
divergence from merger is that a second action will be barred if and only
if the judgment in the first action was "on the merits."' 6 As one might
expect, determining exactly whether a judgment was had on the merits can
be difficult, especially in cases in which a defendant receives a final
judgment of dismissal based on lack ofjurisdiction, misjoinder of parties,
improper venue and the like.'7 However, a generally received doctrine has
evolved to address such judgments, under which these cases are treated as
exceptions to the rule of bar.'"
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, has a somewhat more
circumscribed ambit than does res judicata."9 This is to say that both
doctrines address certain common concerns, but with a differing
emphasis.20 One commentator aptly noted, "[r]es judicata focuses on the
general interest in finality and repose ofjudgments. Collateral estoppel, by
contrast, emphasizes finality of specific instances of fact-finding.",2' To
this policy end, collateral estoppel seeks to block the relitigation of
14. See ROBERT CASAD & PETER SIMON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 731
(1984).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (1982).
16. See CASAD & SIMON, supra note 14, at 736.
17. This problem typically arises when it is unclear from the face of the judgment whether
a dismissal was made with or without prejudice. See, e.g., Costello v. US., 365 U.S. 265, 285-88
(1961) (holding that failure of district court in denaturalization proceeding to specify dismissal (for
lack of jurisdiction) as being 'without prejudice,' did not bar second proceeding).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982).
19. In keeping with the one-bite-at-the-apple metaphor typically used in discussions of
preclusion, many commentators suggest that collateral estoppel leaves narrow, but deep, teeth
marks, resjudicata leaves wide, yet shallow, marks. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 485 (4th ed. 2001):
Res judicata acts like a bludgeon, indiscriminately smashing all efforts of a party
to relitigate events that have already been litigated and decided in a prior suit.
Collateral estoppel, by contrast, operates like a scalpel, dissecting a lawsuit into
its various issues and surgically removing from reconsideration any that have been
properly decided in a prior action.
20. Accordingly, some courts hold that the "finality requirement for issue preclusion is less
stringent than for claim preclusion." Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
21. Shell, supra note 2, at 648.
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specific factual and legal issues that have been decided in prior litigation
based on a different claim.22 It should come as no surprise, then, that
collateral estoppel jurisprudence-because of the specific nature of the
inquiry-has developed a rather elaborate scheme against which to
measure the preclusive potential of any given set of facts.23
Under this scheme, the party seeking preclusion in most situations must
prove (1) that there is a strict identity between the issue contested in the
present action and an issue in the past action,' (2) that the issue was
actually litigated,2 5 (3) that the issue was necessary to the previous
judgment,26 (4) that the party against whom preclusion is sought was a
party to the prior action or in privity,27 and (5) that the party to be barred
had a full and fair opportunity to contest, in the first proceeding, the
evidence relevant to the issue.2" If these threshold elements are met, a
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
23. The elements of collateral estoppel vary somewhat across jurisdictions, even
domestically. Although the question is beyond the scope of the present discussion, we should note
that there is a good deal of confusion as to whether the rules of collateral estoppel are procedural
or substantive (and thus subject to an Erie conflicts analysis). See Bryson v. Gere, 268 F. Supp. 46,
55 (D.D.C. 2003) ("[Clase law is unclear whether collateral estoppel is procedural or substantive.").
This issue becomes doubly complicated when an arbitral award-rather than a judgment-is at
issue. Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 n.14 (2d Cir. 2001) ("This argument raises the question
whether federal law or state law should govern a federal court's determination of the preclusive
effect of an arbitral award-a question that unfortunately has not been much developed.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
25. French v. Jinright & Ryan, P.C., 735 F.2d 433,436 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also Shell, supra
note 2, at 647-48.
26. French, 735 F.2d at 436.
27. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of ll. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971).
28. Id. at 329 (stating that requirement of determining "whether the party against whom an
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.");
Vans, Inc. v. Rosendahl (In re Rosendahl), 307 B.R. 199, 209 (Bankr. D. Ore. 2004) (stating five-
part test). Many courts collapse this five-part test into a four-part test. The court in Central
Transport, Inc. v. Four Phase Systems, Inc., 936 F.2d 256,259 (6th Cir. 1991) stated:
This court has held that the four requisites for issue preclusion are: 1) the issue
precluded must be the same one involved in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue
must actually have been litigated in the prior proceeding; 3) determination of the
issue must have been a critical and necessary part of the decision in the prior
proceeding; and 4) the prior forum must have provided the party against whom
estoppel is asserted a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
See also Bryson v. Gere, 268 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56-57 (D.D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating four-part test).
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second court will bind itself to the findings of a first court and thereby
prevent relitigation of the contested issues. 9
I. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION3 °
It should be abundantly clear at this point that both claim and issue
preclusion serve the desirable social end of keeping stale and settled
disputes from impinging too sharply on the present. More generally:
Their enforcement represents an attempt to secure a prompt and
nonrepetitious judicial system by putting an end to litigation. Other
objectives are to reduce the number of inconsistent results; to
maintain the prestige of the courts by prohibiting litigants from
indirectly overturning a court decision through relitigation of the
same claim or issue; to save money and time of litigants, courts and
the public; and to protect parties from being twice harassed for the
same cause. Thus, the application of the preclusion doctrines results
in the maintenance of certainty in legal relations and the easing of
congested court calendars.3'
The next consideration is whether these policy aims are relevant not
only in the litigation context but also in arbitration. At first blush, certain
justifications (e.g., finality) seem more or less plausible vis-i-vis
arbitration; others (e.g., easing crowded dockets) do not appear so facially
applicable. Nonetheless, nearly all these policy considerations are relevant
in some situations. The problem is to narrow our focus to consider a single
context at a time. That is, the first attempt will be to establish whether
there are identifiable categories that require their own balancing of policy
aims. What one ultimately finds is that the question of whether a court
judgment should preclusively bind a subsequent arbitral tribunal is
29. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324 (stating that any party may invoke issue preclusion
"defensively" against a plaintiff who has already lost on that issue in a prior action); Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that a plaintiff in second action may assert
collateral estoppel "offensively" against defendant who has lost on issue in previous action).
30. For extended discussions of this issue, see Shell, supra note 2; Melissa Hope Biren, Res
Judicata/Collateral Estoppel Effect ofa Court Determination in Subsequent Arbitration, 45 ALB.
L. REV. 1029 (1981); Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion
to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TUL L. REv. 29 (1988) (discussing effects of collateral estoppel
on findings made in arbitration).
31. Biren, supra note 30, at 1036-37.
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analytically distinct from the question whether an arbitral award should
bind a subsequent litigation. The question of whether an arbitral award
should bind a subsequent arbitration triggers yet another balancing of
competing policies.
There are many subtleties that plague attempts to generalize about
preclusion when arbitration is at issue. It is helpful to frame any particular
analysis according to (1) the type of decision for which preclusive effect
is sought (i.e., arbitral award or court judgment) and (2) the type of
subsequent proceeding in which preclusion is sought (i.e., an arbitration








L- itigation Litigation I
The diagram illustrates that different rules-and different underlying
policies-occur in each of these contexts. For the present discussion, the
third quadrant of this matrix (viz., the effect of a judgment on a later
litigation) may be ignored, but the remaining three are worth examining
in some detail.
Before tackling these issues directly, one should briefly look at the
purposes behind arbitration and the procedures that actually implement
these purposes. This becomes necessary because arbitration varies so
significantly from litigation that some courts and tribunals have shied from
applying res judicata and collateral estoppel when presented with the
opportunity.32 It is only by highlighting certain distinctions that an
32. See, e.g., Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 333 F.3d 42,48 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Application
of the estoppel following arbitration ... may be problematic because arbitrators are not required
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observer can determine whether they are significant or merely apparent
vis-i-vis issues of preclusion. Fortunately, these distinctions need not be
considered in a policy vacuum: many of the policy discussions undertaken
in the context of domestic intra-and inter-system preclusion are
informative,33 if not wholly controlling.34
A. Setting the Stage: Domestic Arbitration and Litigation
Domestic commercial arbitration and litigation are relevant to the
ultimate discussion for two reasons. First, many examinations of
preclusion in this area develop arguments based wholly on an
understanding of domestic arbitration. Second, these same arguments
assume the presence of domestic courts and rules of civil procedure
lurking in the background-neither of which, of course, exist in the
international arena.35 One must recognize that international arbitration has
unique features, and that, therefore, analytical paradigms devised for use
in a separate adjudicatory system cannot be simply transported from the
one context into the other without undermining the integrity of
international arbitration as a self-sufficient means of dispute resolution.
None of this is to suggest that domestic arbitration and litigation are
irrelevant in an examination of international arbitration. To the contrary,
an understanding of the way that preclusion is treated in domestic
arbitration-and the biases this treatment reveals when compared to
litigation-is a prerequisite to the arguments, both for and against, as they
are advanced with respect to the international forum.
to provide an explanation for their decision."); Wolf v. Gruntal & Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 524, 528-29
(1st Cir. 1995) (stating that award was not preclusive vis-i-vis claim outside scope of arbitration
clause); Gruntal & Co., Inc. v. Steinberg, 854 F. Supp. 324, 337 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that an
unconfirmed arbitral award lacked preclusive force), aft'd, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); Schlaifer
Nance & Co., Inc. v. Estate of Warhol, 764 F. Supp. 43, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that second
proceeding was not barred because "parties consented to claim splitting in their agreement to a
limited arbitration clause."), aff'd, 119 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1997).
33. E.g., why should a state-court judgment bind a federal court?
34. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133 (3d ed. 1997)
(examining preclusion principles as they arise in "intersystemic" contexts---e.g., whether a state
court should give preclusive effect to a federal judgment and vice versa).
35. There is no International Commercial Court, and there are no International Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Vol. 18
20061 ONLY ONE KICK AT THE CAT. A CONTEXTUAL RUBRIC FOR EVALUATING RESJUDICATA 559
B. General Nature of and Procedures in Domestic Arbitration
Foremost, arbitration is a private and contractual means of dispute
resolution.3 6 As a creature of contract, any particular arbitration owes its
existence-and attendant limitations-to an arbitral agreement.37 This
means that, in practice, the parties select their own "judges," forum, and
rules.3 By agreeing to arbitration, parties hope to achieve several goals:
First, parties in ongoing commercial relationships with one another,
such as traders in particular markets or participants in certain
industries, often seek arbitration as a means of preserving their
relationship by avoiding the antagonisms that attend hard-fought
court adjudication. Second, arbitration allows experts familiar with
the customs and practices peculiar to an industry to serve as judges.
Finally, parties agree to commercial arbitration simply to avoid the
cost and delay of formal court proceedings-with their attendant
discovery procedures, evidence rules, and rights of appeal-when
they anticipate having routine business disputes. Arbitration has
proven to be quicker, cheaper, and more predictable than litigation
as a means of resolving many types of commercial claims.39
This complex set of motives leads to a system that is at once broader and
narrower than litigation. It is "broader" because an arbitrator is likely to
evaluate the ongoing relationship between the parties, as opposed to the
specific dispute at hand. It is "narrower" because the scope of the
arbitration is controlled by the agreement.4°
The arbitrators' concern for a "suitable" rather than a legally correct
decision has important consequences for the conduct of the arbitral process
36. MARTIN DoMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION I (Gabriel M. Wilner ed.,
1984); Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130(9th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n
agreement to arbitrate is a matter of contract.").
37. FRANKELKOURIu& EDNAASPERELKOURI, HOwARBITRATIONWORKS 321 (3d ed. 1973);
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("lIt is a way to resolve those
disputes-but only those disputes-that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.").
38. An arbitration agreement either directly or indirectly (via a selection of some
organization's rules) allows the parties to select their own judges, who do not, incidentally, need
to be judges or even lawyers. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n. 18 (1974).
39. Shell, supra note 2, at 629.
40. Motomura, supra note 30, at 38 (stating that this broader perspective "is partly a practical
consideration; an arbitrator's professional success depends heavily on whether the disputants are
satisfied with the award. Such satisfaction may turn as much on the viability of the disputants'
continuing relationship as on the 'correct' resolution of the dispute in isolation.").
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itself. First, arbitrators are not bound by the law, substantive or
procedural.4 Thus, numerous courts and commentators have quite aptly
analogized arbitration to a classic suit in equity, in which the Chancellor
was more concerned with justice than with a slavish adherence to legal
formalities.42 Second, arbitrators are free to render compromise rather than
winner-take-all awards.43 Moreover, this freedom to compromise does not
appear to be an unexercised abstraction: empirical evidence strongly
suggests that arbitrators do tend to "split the difference."
This freedom to make compromise awards is a manifestation of two
further-yet related-distinctions between arbitration and litigation: the
absence of an obligation to justify the precise basis of an award and the
limited grounds under which an award may be reviewed. In practice, this
means that an arbitrator need not write a judicially appropriate decision
that offers a ratio decidendi tied to particular facts.45 As Justice Blackmun
flatly put it, "arbitrators are not bound by precedent and are actually
discouraged by their associations from giving reasons for a decision."
This divergence from what we think of as normal judicial practice is
supportable mainly because an award itself (i.e., not the reasoning behind
41. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) ("Arbitration carries
no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed by both the Seventh Amendment and by Ch. 1, Art. 12th,
of the Vermont Constitution... the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court
trial."); Mulholland Constr. Co. v. Lee Pare & Ass'n, 576 A.2d 1236, 1238 (R.I. 1990) ("It must
be remembered that an arbitration proceeding is not constricted by the rules of pleading and other
legal parameters that might attach to an action at law or in equity."). For a discussion of the very
limited constraints placed on arbitrators with respect to substantive law, see infra text
accompanying notes 53 & 106.
42. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch. Dist. v. Bellmore-Merrick
United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 347 N.E.2d 603, 606 (stating that arbitrator has power to
disregard technicalities in reaching just results). See also Biren, supra note 30, at 1043 n.64.
43. See Duferco Int'l Steel v. T. Klaveness Shipping, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003) ("It
should be remembered that arbitrators are hired by parties to reach a result that conforms to
industry norms and to the arbitrator's notions of firness."); Mulholland, 576 A.2d at 1238 ("As
long as the award is drawn from the essence of the contract and is not wholly irrational, the
arbitrators may make determinations that might otherwise not be possible to a judicial tribunal.");
Shell, supra note 2, at 633.
44. See David E. Bloom, Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional
Arbitration, 68 REv. ECON. & STAT. 578, 584 (1986).
45. BBS Norwalk One, Inc. v. Raccolta, Inc., 117 F.3d 674,678 (2d Cir. 1997) ("While the
arbitrator gave no reasons for his decision, New York law did not require him to do so.").
46. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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it) is respected by the judiciary as nearly inviolate.47 Accordingly, a court
has no authority to vacate an award because a tribunal appears to ignore
the law48 or if the decision does not track with the results that a court
would have reached.49 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5" provides, for
instance, that an award is final and confirmable unless a complaining party
can show:
(1) that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undo
means; or
(2) that the arbitrators exhibited "evident partiality"; or
(3) that there was gross misconduct by the arbitrators; or
(4) that the arbitrators failed to render a final decision."'
The U.S. Supreme Court has authorized a fifth avenue by which to attack
an award: namely, a "manifest disregard" for applicable law. 2 One should
not, however, equate "manifest disregard" with a mere error of law or fact;
as a general rule a court does "not sit to hear claims of factual or legal
error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of
lower courts." 53
There is another class of differences between the two methods of
dispute settlement that causes considerable discomfort for commentators
contemplating the application of preclusion in arbitration. This type of
47. See Nat'l Wrecking Co. v. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 990 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that arbitrators are not "junior varsity trial courts."); Stulberg v. Intermedics Orthopedics,
Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. I1. 1998) ("Federal courts extend extraordinary deference to
the decisions of arbitrators.").
48. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled by, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that disputes under the Securities Act
of 1933 should proceed to arbitration because arbitration would not affect the substantive
provisions of the Act, thus overturning Wilko v. Swan, which was found to be no longer applicable).
49. See Grace Lines, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n., 239 N.Y.S.2d 293,298
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (stating that "an award may not be set aside because others might have
reached a different conclusion."), af'd, 246 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1964).
50. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2005).
51. Shell, supra note 2, at 637.
52. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,259 (1987).
53. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). Some Circuit
Courts have taken this to mean that an arbitrator must have understood a controlling point of law
and decided to ignore it anyway. See, e.g., Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346,355-58
(5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the high threshold for demonstrating a"manifest disregard ofthe law.").
The Seventh Circuit has taken an even more restrictive view, one "limited to the situation in which
the arbitral award directs the parties to violate the law." IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance
Assocs., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2001).
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difference, which we may broadly refer to as "procedure," is relevant to
preclusion because it goes to the question of whether a particular issue was
fully and fairly heard or whether an issue or claim was even heard at all.54
A catalogue of these procedural differences is seemingly infinite, but there
are a few that seem to make most everyone's short list:
As a rule, those who sponsor or conduct arbitration have
considerable discretion to adopt procedures that they deem
appropriate. While some arbitrations are elaborate, more typically
they are less formal than court litigation. As a practical matter,
discovery is often limited or unavailable. Arbitrators are not bound
by the rules of evidence and indeed may draw on their personal
knowledge in making awards. Witnesses need not be required to
testify under oath. If a written record of a proceeding exists, it need
not be as complete as in litigation."5
Now that the outline by which to conduct a differential analysis of
litigation and arbitration exists, one must examine whether and to what
extent these differences influence the application of res judicata and
collateral estoppel in domestic arbitration.
1. Should Judicial Decisions Be Binding in a Subsequent Arbitration?"'
Whether a prior court decision should preclude issues or claims in a
subsequent arbitration presents the easiest case for analysis. It is the
"easiest" primarily because there is generally little room to debate whether
adequate procedures were followed in a litigation. That is, one can safely
assume that the rules of evidence and the rules of civil procedure were
followed and that formal records sufficiently memorialize both the
proceeding itself and the ultimate decision. Procedural regularity is
mentioned not necessarily because it is an analytic tool, but because so
many jurists and scholars see it as an impediment to the application of
preclusionary doctrines.5 7
54. See, e.g., Matter of Guetta [Raxon Fabrics Corp.], 510 N.Y.S.2d 576, 578 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) ("[The arbitrator was under no obligation to explain his decision in the first place; even
less was he required to specifically mention the particular issues he decided or to set forth his
findings with respect thereto.") (citation omitted).
55. Motomura, supra note 30, at 36.
56. For a discussion devoted entirely to this topic, see Biren, supra note 30.
57. See Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1137 (5th Cir. 1991) ("It
is true that arbitral findings typically lack the supervisory scrutiny of authoritative review, giving
rise to the argument that arbitration risks determinations based on irrelevant or hearsay evidence,
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There are two archetypal and regularly recurring situations in which a
tribunal may be called upon to decide whether claims or issues before it
are barred by res judicata. 8 In the first type of case, the parties have sought
a court determination regarding the arbitrability of a dispute, either by
moving to compel or stay arbitration. Once they have the court's decision
in hand, this is clearly a case for collateral estoppel; it would be wasteful
to allow either one of the parties to raise the issue of arbitrability before a
subsequent tribunal. There is a second-and also easily dispensed
with-type of case in which a prior court decision should preclude. Here,
the parties commence litigation in the face of a valid arbitration agreement
and proceed to judgment without either party objecting. Later, the
disappointed party invokes the arbitration clause and attempts to reopen
the case before a tribunal. In this type of case all the policy considerations
such as fairness, judicial repose, and economy are relevant. There is no
countervailing policy that supports this type of judgment shopping,
particularly when the parties have expressly or impliedly waived their right
to arbitrate.59 Thus, the tribunal need only determine an identity of parties,
issues, and claims to allow preclusion to take its course.'
or the personal whims of arbitral panel members."); Gruntal & Co, Inc. v. Steinberg, 854 F. Supp.
324, 337 (D.N.J. 1994) ("In reviewing an arbitral award for issue preclusive effect, it must be kept
in mind that arbitration panels are not courts of law and that arbitral procedures often vary
significantly from judicial procedures.").
58. For a discussion devoted entirely to this topic, see Biren, supra note 30.
59. Hoffman Constr. v. Active Erectors & Installers, Inc., 969 F.2d 796, 798-99 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that a waiver of arbitration in favor of a state-court suit constituted waiver of right
to arbitrate subsequent RICO claim); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the United Food
& Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 564 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e are satisfied that the jury's
verdict. . . was sufficiently final to bind the arbitrators here."); Miller Brewing Co. v. Ft. Worth
Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1986) ("We conclude ...that, even if waiver
considerations did not apply, [claimant] is barred from arbitration under the doctrine ofresjudicata
because it could have included, and implicitly did include, in its state court proceedings a claim for
the damages it now seeks to arbitrate."); HG Estate v. Corporacion Durango, S.A. DE de C.V., 271
F. Supp. 2d 587,592 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[P]resumably arbitrators would give some preclusive
effect to prior litigation results."); Esquire Indus., Inc. v. E. Bay Textiles, Inc., 414 N.Y.S.2d 336
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding that parties can waive arbitration by their conduct, such as by
plaintiffrs service of summons and defendant's application to stay arbitration).
60. There is another, and somewhat trickier, type of case that arises from time to time.
Suppose two parties litigate a matter that is related to an arbitration between one of the parties and
a stranger to the litigation. Should the stranger be able to invoke collateral estoppel against the
litigant with whom he has the related dispute? The answer to that question is beyond the scope of
this Article, but there is ample discussion of it in the domestic arbitration literature. See, e.g., Biren,
supra note 30, at 1051-56.
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2. When Should Arbitral Awards Be Preclusive?
Although most courts concede that arbitral awards can be preclusive,
they are nonetheless reluctant to afford awards conclusive effect, at least
absent what appears to be a heightened showing. The problem arises from
courts' suspicion of arbitral procedures: "Because arbitrations are not
conducted in courts of law and arbitrators are not bound by the same rules
of evidence and procedure that judges are, 'courts must be cautious of
procedural variances between arbitral procedures and judicial proceedings
when deciding whether to give preclusive effect to the former.""' Thus,
the most restrictive courts will not allow preclusion to attach to arbitral
findings unless "the arbitration had the elements of an adjudicatory
procedure." 2 Courts operating in this mode look at a range of factors to
determine whether an arbitration provided "the requisite procedural
safeguards to give it issue-preclusive effect:"
(1) the [arbitration] was conducted in a judicial-like adversary
proceeding; (2) the proceedings required witnesses to testify under
oath; (3) the [arbitral] determination involved the adjudicatory
application of rules to a single set of facts; (4) the proceedings were
conducted before an impartial hearing officer; (5) the parties had
the right to subpoena witnesses and present documentary evidence;
and (6) the [arbitrator] maintained a verbatim record of the
proceedings. Additional factors include whether the hearing
officer's decision was adjudicatory and in writing with a statement
of reasons. Finally, [whether] that reasoned decision [was] adopted
by the director of the agency with the potential for later judicial
review.63
61. Shtab v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 255,261 (D.N.J. 2001) (citing
Gruntal, 854 F. Supp. at 337) (citing Universal Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1137
(5th Cir. 1991)). The court in Vandenberg v. Superior Ct., 982 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1999) stated:
Whether collateral estoppel is fair and consistent with public policy in a particular
case depends in part upon the character of the forum that first decided the issue
later sought to be foreclosed. In this reguard, courts consider the judicial nature
of the prior forum, i.e., its legal formality, the scope of its jurisdiction, and its
procedural safeguards, particularly including the opportunity for judicial review
of adverse rulings.
62. Jacobs v. CBS Broad. Inc., 291 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kelly v. Vons.
Cos., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
63. Jacobs, 291 F.3dat 1179 (quoting Imen v. Glassford, 247 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988)).
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But other courts are not particularly concerned about arbitration's relative
informality because the parties chose to contract for it." There is no way
to reconcile these extremes, but a more general review of case law
demonstrates that courts more often follow a middle course, one that is
deferential to arbitral findings, so long as they are reasonably clear and
treating them as conclusive would not work an injustice.
"The law provides two separate bases for a federal court to afford prior
judgments preclusive effect."' The question presented thus becomes
whether an unconfirmed arbitral award qualifies as a "judgment" under
either basis." The first potential source of preclusion is statutory: the Full
Faith and Credit Act mandates that state "judicial proceedings ... shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
... as they shall have by law or usage in the courts of such State.6'6? As a
general matter, this means that a federal court must give preclusive effect
to a state court judgment." The Supreme Court, however, has held that the
Full Faith and Credit Act does not apply to unconfirmed arbitration awards
because they are not "judicial proceedings" within the meaning of that
act." "Thus, it is clear that an unconfirmed arbitration award does not have
preclusive effect on a federal court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. "70
"Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, where the parties have had
full opportunity to be heard in arbitration, federal courts may give
64. "Within exceedingly broad limits, the parties to an arbitration agreement choose their
method of dispute resolution and are bound by it however bad their choice appears to be either ex
ante or expost." IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Ass'n, 266 F.3d 645,649,651 (7th Cir. 2001)
(stating that claims arising out of "the dispute the arbitrators were asked to resolve and we think
did resolve, are closed to further litigation by the principles ofresjudicata and collateral estoppel,"
even though record suggested that "the arbitrators lacked the professional competence required to
resolve the parties' disputes.").
65. Stulberg v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-66 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(emphasis added) (holding that in this private contract dispute, previous arbitration award had
preclusive effect).
66. As noted elsewhere, arbitral awards are often confirmed by the judgment of a court. See
Shell, supra note 2, at 642.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2005).
68. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986); Stulberg, 997 F. Supp. at 1066.
69. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284,287-88 (1984); Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,477 (1982).
70. Stulberg, 997 F. Supp. at 1066; but see Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 199 (3d Cir.
1999) ("Under Pennsylvania law, arbitration proceedings and their findings are considered final
judgments for the purpose of collateral estoppel."); Hartford Accident. & Indem. Co. v. Columbia
Cas. Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 251,255 (D. Conn. 2000) ("Under Connecticut law, a final arbitration
award (even one never reviewed by any court) is accorded resjudicata or collateral estoppel effect
in much the same manner as a judgment of a court.").
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
arbitration judgments preclusive effect as a matter of public policy."'" This
is so because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, courts "have
frequently fashioned common-law rules of preclusion in the absence of a
governing statute."'72 Thus, unconfirmed awards "can, but do not
necessarily, have preclusive effect on subsequent federal court
proceedings."" As one district court has described it, this is a permissive
standard under which "courts are not required to afford previous
unconfirmed arbitration awards preclusive effect on later federal
proceedings; however, courts may impose such preclusion in appropriate
cases."
74
In applying this standard, one finds that courts make a rough distinction
between situations involving federal civil rights and those turning on
purely commercial relationships. Courts generally attribute this distinction
to McDonald v. City of West Branch, in which the Supreme Court
conceded that "arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes"
but held that arbitration "cannot provide an adequate substitute for a
judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional
rights that § 1983 [a civil rights statute] is designed to safeguard."M This
holding is not as broad as it might seem. Subsequent case law has made it
clear that most federal claims are arbitrable and that once they are reduced
to decision, they can be preclusive.76
71. Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int'l Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(refusing to give St. Louis arbitrator's decision preclusive effect where parties did not have full
opportunity to litigate).
72. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794.
73. Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
arbitrator's award was not preclusive because it was never confirmed as required by New York civil
law); but see Brody v. Hankin, 299 F. Supp. 2d 454,461 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("[W]e find that whether
or not the Common Pleas Court has yet to formally confirm the award.., the arbitration award
rendered in this case constitutes a final judgment on the merits...").
74. Swlberg, 997 F. Supp. at 1066 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
223 (1985) for the proposition that "federal courts may determine the preclusive effect to be given
to an arbitration proceeding.").
75. 466 U.S. 284,290(1984).
76. The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 stated:
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title
VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true
where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and
decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record.
See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (finding that nothing in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) specifically precludes arbitration ofclaims
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a. Special Problems in Res Judicata
The scope of an arbitral award's preclusive force-as with a
judgment--can be quite extensive. But because arbitration is a creature of
contract, that scope often has interesting wrinkles at its margins." Gemco
Latinoamercia, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp.78 is paradigmatic in several
respects because the relationship between the parties is a common one, the
dispute arose from fairly routine facts, and the court struggled to determine
the preclusive effect of an arbitral award. For over a decade, Gemco was
the exclusive distributor of Seiko-brand products in Puerto Rico. 9 At some
point, the relationshipsoured, and Gemco claimed that Seiko had retaliated
against it for selling outside its territory and Seiko claimed that Gemco had
abandoned its territory. 0 An arbitration ensued, in which Seiko sought
nearly three million dollars for goods sold and delivered, and Gemco
counterclaimed for, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of a Puerto
Rico dealership law.8"
77. One of these wrinkles raises a fundamental question that is often overlooked: viz., what
tribunal should decide the preclusive effect of an award? Most courts have held that-so long as
there is a broad arbitration agreement between the parties--a res judicata defense is itselfa matter
for arbitration. See Chiron v. Ortho, 207 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) ("(A] res judicata
objection based on a prior arbitration proceeding is a legal defense that, in turn, is a component of
the dispute on the merits and must be considered by the arbitrator, not the court."); Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Balco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the defense of
preclusion is matter for arbitrator because "it is itself a component of the dispute on the merits.").
This appears to be the majority rule in federal courts. See Kenneth R. Pierce, The Liar's Paradox:
ArbitrabilityConundrumsundertheFederalArbitrationAct, 13 MEALEY'SL1TIGATIONREPORTER:
REINSURANCE 5 (Mar. 20, 2003) ("The majority of cases decided under the Federal Arbitration Act
have held that both claim preclusion (resjudicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) are part
of the merits of a dispute which should be resolved by arbitrators rather than courts."); But see
Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (1 th Cir. 1993) ("We
think the better rule is that courts can decide resjudicata."). Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article exhaustively to examine whether the preclusive effect of an award is a matter for arbitration
or for litigation, one must note that-outside federal courts-there is a clear split of authority on
the issue. One commentator has demonstrated, for example, that New York courts may answer the
question one way if New York arbitration law applies and another way if the FAA applies. See
Daniel L. Elsberg, Federal Arbitration Act vs. New York State Arbitration Law, N.Y.L.J., May 6,
2005, at 4.
78. 671 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), modified, 685 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
79. Id. at 973.
80. Id. at 974.
81. Id.
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The arbitrators made no factual findings; they awarded Seiko most of
its requested relief and dismissed the counterclaims.8 2 In a brief responding
to Seiko's defenses to the counterclaims, Gemco argued that Seiko's
retaliation against it was part of(l) a horizontal conspiracy to drive it from
the market and (2) a vertical attempt to fix resale prices.8 3 After the
arbitration concluded, Gemco sued for antitrust violations arising from the
same facts that had given rise to the arbitration." The court reviewed the
complaint, concluded that the facts alleged therein were "virtually
identical to those involved in the arbitration," and held that "absent an
exception to the operation of the res judicata doctrine, the judgment
confirming the arbitration award precludes relitigation of the antitrust and
unfair competition claims against Seiko Time in this proceeding."85 The
court went on to hold that-via collateral estoppel-the dismissal of the
antitrust claims would not extend to two of Seiko's corporate family
members, neither of which participated in the arbitration, because the
affiliates committed independent anticompetitive acts."
Two lessons emerge here. First, a claimant in arbitration (or a
counterclaimant) must assert all theories of recovery that are
transactionally related to the subject matter of the lawsuit or risk having
them barred in a subsequent proceeding. Second, an arbitration panel's
failure to make detailed findings can make it impossible for a later tribunal
to determine whether a particular issue was in fact resolved.87 This is
especially problematic in dealer termination cases because a dealer quite
often will claim that its termination was part and parcel of an antitrust
violation. Res judicata may well bar litigation of that claim between the
parties, but non-parties (e.g., affiliates or individuals) will not benefit from
this bar unless the arbitral tribunal makes findings sufficient to satisfy the
elements of collateral estoppel.
82. Id. at 975.
83. Gemco Latinoamerica, 671 F. Supp. at 975.
84. Id. at 977-78.
85. Id. at 978.
86. On a motion to reconsider, the court concluded that--even if there were not independent
acts--collateral estoppel would not apply because it was impossible to tell with certainty why the
arbitrators had rejected the antitrust defense to Seiko's business justification defense. Gemco
Latinoamerica, 685 F. Supp. at 403.
87. See BBS Norwalk One, Inc. v. Raccolta, Inc., 117 F.3d 674,678 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that "Delphic quality" of unreasoned award required remand to district court for review of
arbitration record prior to passing on collateral estoppel).
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b. Special Problems in Collateral Estoppel
A somewhat controversial case within which to consider preclusion
arises when an arbitral award is the putative basis for res judicata. As
noted earlier, the effect that an award will have upon a litigation is roughly
a direct function of the particular court's conception of preclusion. Thus,
a court that embraces the broad transactional formulation advanced in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments88 will be more likely to preclude than
will a court in the grips of the narrower "a claim equals a specific theory
of recovery" school. Moreover, it seems that there is a lingering suspicion
of arbitration that may lead even those courts that favor the Restatement
position in the context of pure litigation to adopt the narrower view when
faced with an arbitral award. This is not to suggest, however, that
preclusion is out the window when a court evaluates the impact of an
arbitral award. Rather, courts often make a subtle shift in emphasis from
claims to issues; that is, they bar on the basis of collateral estoppel, not res
judicata (in the narrow sense).89
For instance, in what many courts and commentators view as an
essential case on the subject of arbitral collateral estoppel, City of
Gainesville v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co.,9° the City-in the midst of an
arbitration with Island Creek-sued a coal supply company for fraud and
RICO violations.9' In the meantime, the arbitrators found that Island Creek
had not breached its contract with the City and was therefore entitled to
collect according to the contract terms. The court was then faced with the
possibility of barring the City's entire claim, a possibility that it apparently
did not relish. In a deft dodge of the issue, the court found that the City had
presented different claims than had been decided in arbitration, but
dismissed the suit anyway. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court
reasoned that the contractual issues settled in arbitration effectively
88. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24(2). See also Shell, supra note 2, at 641-42
("Under most arbitration rules.. , arbitration awards do not need judicial confirmation to be
binding on parties.").
89. Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 335-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Courts will apply
collateral estoppel and not resjudicata because the values of avoiding embarrassing inconsistencies
and avoiding burdening a court and an adversary with repetitious litigation are 'served more
directly by issue preclusion than by claim preclusion."'). Of course, some courts will preclude on
the basis of claims. See Goldstein v. Do, 236 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 484
(2d Cir. 1965); Century Int'l Arms, Ltd. v. Fed. State Unitary Enter. State Corp.
'Rosvoorouzhenie,' 172 F. Supp. 2d 79, 97 (D.D.C. 2001) ("Under the doctrine of res judicata...
all of these claims were required to be litigated before the Tribunal;" also noting that claims were
precluded on grounds of collateral estoppel).
90. 618 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Fla. 1984), afrd, 771 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 516.
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stripped away-via collateral estoppel-the legal underpinnings of the
new claims.92
Of course reliance upon collateral estoppel as the mechanism of choice
for precluding issues settled in arbitration is not without its own problems.
The primary hurdle that a party invoking issue preclusion must overcome
is built on the four essential elements of collateral estoppel: identity of
issue, actually litigated and necessary to the decision, privity, and full and
fair opportunity to litigate. Given the differences between arbitration and
litigation, it is not surprising that challenges to collateral estoppel focus on
those differences, particularly relating to the question of whether the party
to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to litigate.93
In a much discussed case on this point, Matter ofAmerican Insurance
Co. [Messinger-Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.] 9" the New York Court
of Appeals undertook an examination of when arbitral findings might
adhere to a subsequent court proceeding, even though the arbitration
lacked most of the formalities associated with litigation. The issue of
preclusion arose out of an arbitration involving slightly less than $5,000
in property damage resulting from an automobile accident.95 Aetna
disclaimed coverage, but the arbitrators awarded about $1,200 to
American anyway." In reaching its decision the tribunal relied wholly on
each company's files: there were no hearings, no witnesses, and no oral or
written arguments.9" The award provided no specific findings to suggest
how or upon what it was based.98
Aetna then sued, once again asserting the issue of coverage.99
American, sensing deja vu, pled collateral estoppel, a contention with
which the trial court agreed, thereby barring the disclaimer of coverage
defense.' ° Aetna appealed and American joined Aetna in arguing that
collateral estoppel could endanger the industry's small claims dispute
mechanism.'0° The New York Court of Appeals was unimpressed, holding
that-absent a specific contractual agreement not to preclude-relitigation
92. Id. at 518.
93. The other issues arise, but not to the extent of"full and fair opportunity to litigate."
94. 371 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y. 1977).
95. Id. at 800.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 803.
98. Id. Also note that this case raises issues of "actually litigated and necessary to the award,"
given that there was no written statement of reasons.
99. Am. Ins. Co., 371 N.E.2d at 800.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 800-01.
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of the coverage issue was inappropriate. 2 The Court reasoned that the
parties had agreed to arbitrate with relative informality, and, moreover,
that the mere existence of an award logically preempted Aetna's argument
that the tribunal might not have decided the coverage issue.'0 3 Subsequent
New York case law has extended this holding beyond the small claims
sphere, thus allowing arbitral decisions to preclude in much larger cases,
even in the face of a New York statute allowing de novo review of awards
(made under the New York no-fault scheme) of $5,000 and up.'
04
3. Must Arbitrators Give Preclusive Effect to Prior Decisions?
The remaining issues arising from the matrix (i.e., whether a judgment
or award should bind a subsequent arbitration) appear deceptively simple.
In other words, since it has been established that both judgments and
awards can be preclusive, what else is there to discuss? To answer this
question, one must recall that the preclusion equation is a function of two
variables: the decision offered as conclusive (award or judgment) and the
forum in which preclusion is sought (arbitration or litigation). What one
finds is that the second variable is as important as the first, owing largely
to the special nature of arbitration.
Simply stated, "Arbitrators need not follow judicial notions of issue
and claim preclusion....",'05 This is a specific application of the more
general notion that arbitrators are not bound to follow the law.0 6 Thus,
Although res judicata and collateral estoppel usually attach to
arbitration awards, they do so (if they do so) as a matter of contract
rather than as a matter of law. The preclusive effect of the award is
102. Id. at 802-04.
103. Id. at 803.
104. See N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 5106(c) (McKinney 1985). See also Shell, supra note 2, at
654 n. 158 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Clacher, 491 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1985) (holding that
an unconfirmed arbitration award finding an insured was unable to work because of disabling
injuries was preclusive on all issues resolved by the arbitration award); Sansiviero v. Royal Globe
Ins., 486 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1985) (finding that an arbitration award of less than $5000 barred an
insured's complaint for additional damages from car accident injuries); Clemens v. Apple, 477
N.Y.S.2d 774 (1984), aftd, 481 N.E.2d 560 (1985) (holding that a plaintiffwho lost an arbitration
suit for $2000 was later precluded in $250,000 negligence action stemming from the same injuries).
105. Lindland v. U.S. of Am. Wrestling Ass'n, 230 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000).
106. SeegenerallyPostlewaitev. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 333 F.3d 42,49 (2dCir. 2003) (holding
that an award was confirmable "if there is even a barely colorable justification for the outcome
reached.") (citing Willemign Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d
at 13).
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as much a creature of the arbitration contract as any other aspect of
the legal-dispute machinery established by such a contract.17
This does not mean, of course, that an arbitral panel should not give
preclusive effect to prior judgments and awards.' But it does mean that
parties to arbitral agreements should make it clear in those agreements that
they intend prior decisions to be binding."o
IV. PRECLUSION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
At the outset of this section, it is perhaps useful to collect, condense,
and catalogue the differences between arbitration and litigation that prove
most troublesome for those contemplating preclusion in the domestic
context. As the above discussions reveal, it is the fact that arbitration is
only imperfectly analogous to litigation that provides the greatest
stumbling block for courts and commentators. Certainly, a number of
specific objections arise from arbitration's method of fact-finding and
decision-making; this-as we have seen-tends to be the focus of a court
that takes up the matter. However, there is a class of policy objections that
is not so obviously manifest in case law, but which proves equally
troublesome for commentators:
107. IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Ass'n, 266 F.3d 645,651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).
108. Hoffman Constr. v. Active Erectors & Installers, 969 F.2d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 1992)
(enjoining arbitration on grounds ofresjudicata); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A of the
United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 563 (8th Cir. 1990) ("For the arbitrator to
reject the jury verdict was to disregard the law and to substitute his own brand of industrial justice
for the deliberations and verdict of the jury." (internal citations omitted)).
109. See, e.g., United Indus. Workers v. Gov't of Virgin Is., 987 F.2d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 1993)
("Absent a collective bargaining agreement provision that requires arbitrators to be bound by earlier
arbitration awards, the parties delegate to the arbitrator the power to decide the preclusive effect
of prior arbitration awards."). The Court in HRH Constr. Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 384
N.E.2d 1289 (N.Y. 1978) stated that:
We hold that a provision in an otherwise broad arbitration clause that the
determination of particular disputes in another judicial or arbitration proceeding
shall be determinative and conclusive between the parties, does not limit the scope
of arbitration but constitutes a directive as to how the dispute in question shall be
resolved in arbitration.
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[T]he social and institutional interests that attach to court
adjudication do not attach to arbitration proceedings. Courts are
public institutions created and maintained by the state. Court
judgments are publicly recorded and maintained by the state as
reliable evidence of how the rights of citizens have been interpreted
under the law. In addition, litigation frequently results in the
declaration of rules for deciding future cases, a matter of great
public interest. Arbitration, on the other hand, is a private institution
created and sustained by contract. Arbitration awards are private
documents maintained only by the involved parties and signal only
that a dispute between them has been resolved. Arbitration
decisions have no effect on future cases, even in the rare instances
when the arbitrators write opinions explaining their awards."'
Probably the most significant of these differences for most
commentators is that arbitration is a creature of contract. This fixation on
contract has led, unfortunately, to some scholars making an overly
restrictive conclusion: namely, that arbitral awards should have only the
barest preclusive effect."' There is nonetheless a general agreement that
claim preclusion is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of a
functioning system of international arbitration; anything less would make
a sham of the process:
If res judicata did not apply to arbitration, parties could safely
ignore demands to arbitrate knowing that a default judgment against
them would not prejudice their case in a later lawsuit. Losing
parties in arbitration could relitigate their claims in court, and
winning parties could attempt to supplement their victories with
additional claims and damage theories arising from the same
transaction addressed by the arbitrators." 2
110. Shell, supra note 2, at 658.
111. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 30, at 81 (stating that this restrictive perspective offers
the benefit of giving "courts maximum freedom to find that disputes are arbitrable because they
would know that findings in an arbitration would not be subject to collateral estoppel" and allows
arbitration to be a basic dispute resolution forum without being hampered by inefficient lawmaking
effects).
112. Shell, supra note 2, at 664. One can argue that-in the international context-the
Convention tacitly endorses application of claim preclusion but not issue preclusion. Author
Sabrina Sudol states:
Thus under the Convention, res judicata is certain-a future action based on the
same claim is precluded if it has been decided in a foreign arbitration. However,
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Issue preclusion is viewed with somewhat more suspicious eyes; some
even favor "a rule that arbitral findings never have collateral estoppel
effect, unless the arbitration agreement clearly and expressly provides for
it." "3 Whether this contract-based reasoning is sound even in the domestic
context is a discussion for another day. What is clear, though, is that in the
international context, this mode of analysis leads nowhere, primarily
because there is no bundle of litigation policy to pit directly against a
bundle of contract policy. That is, traditional biases against arbitration first
arose because arbitration was an alternative to litigation. " 4 And because
not every policy justification for preclusion obtains with respect to
arbitration, then any justification for preclusion in the new arbitral context
must reflect what the parties bargained for and no more."5
There are a number of reasons why this reasoning fails when applied
to international commercial arbitration. First, and most important,
arbitration is not just an alternative to litigation vis-,A-vis international
disputes. Absent a system of international civil courts, arbitration is the
only possibility for parties to find a neutral forum."' The only alternative
would be to bring suits in national courts, hardly a satisfactory situation."'
collateral estoppel is not necessarily mandated--an issue which has already been
determined in a prior arbitration could be relitigated if the new action is based on
a different claim.
Sabrina M. Sudol, The UN. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards and issue Preclusion: A Traditional Collateral Estoppel Determination, 65 U. PITT. L. REV.
931,940 (2004).
113. Motomura, supra note 30, at 81.
114. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 n.4 (1974) (noting historical
common-law prejudice against arbitration).
115. See Brian Levine, Note, Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the
Application of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 4 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 435 (1999).
116. Accordingly, "The binding effect of arbitral awards is prescribed by many institutional
rules." INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, INTERIM REPORT: "RES JUDICATA" AND ARBITRATION
22 (2004) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
117. Considering the policy behind federal diversity jurisdiction in the United States:
All forms of arbitration usually implicate perceptions about cost, efficiency and
expertise. International arbitration, however, involves greater emphasis on
foreclosing the gamesmanship of parallel foreign litigation in each side's home
court... When a dispute has contacts with multiple countries, the parties may
seek a playing field that is more neutral (procedurally, politically, and
linguistically) than national courts.
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Thus, arbitration is no mere supplement or alternative to litigation; it is the
only game in town. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth,"' the U.S. Supreme Court-in a specific discussion of
arbitrability-acknowledged the growing significance of and necessity for
international arbitration:
As international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the
course of that trade. The controversies that international arbitral
institutions are called upon to resolve have increased in diversity as
well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for
efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from
commercial relations has not yet been tested. If they are to take a
central place in the international legal order, national courts will
need to "shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration"... and
also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede
jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or
transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary
for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability
to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration." 9
Second, it is fallacious to assume that the international legal
community has any less interest in the repose and finality of decisions than
does a national legal system. 20 True, there is not a direct "drain on limited
public resources" argument to be made, but the costs of multiple
international dispute resolutions-though initially borne solely by the
parties involved-are surely passed on to consumers. Moreover, one must
assume that parties-although perhaps disappointed by certain particular
decisions-are no less interested than their domestic counterparts in
general legal certainty. Res judicata has always rested-in some
fundamental way-on considerations of fairness. In most legal systems,
mechanisms have evolved to ensure (absent extraordinary circumstances)
that disputants get only one chance to either bring or defend a cause of
action.
William W. Park, The Specificity ofinternationalArbitration: The Casefor FAA Reform, 36 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1241, 1256 (2003).
118. 473 U.S. 614(1985).
119. Id. at 638-39 (citation omitted).
120. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 116, at 3. ("It is generally accepted that the resjudicata
doctrine applies in the context of international arbitration, such that a final award has resjudicata
effect...").
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Third, the old argument that the arbitral process is too unlike litigation
to allow preclusion makes even less sense when applied to international
arbitration. The reasons for not allowing preclusion when arbitration is
involved fall into one of two broad categories. On the one hand, objections
may be based on the lack of discovery or the failure to follow the rules of
evidence.' 2' On the other hand, there are complaints about the lack of legal
acumen on the part of arbitrators and the failure of arbitrators to offer a
reasoned analysis of their awards. 2 The first objection, even if it has some
validity domestically, makes no sense in the international field. A party
would rarely get U.S. style discovery or procedure outside a U.S. court
anyway, and, moreover, this lack has never stopped other jurisdictions
from developing some form of domestic res judicata.'23 Too, international
arbitrations tend to be relatively formal, employing well-defined
procedural norms (via the rules of a sponsoring institution).2 4 The second
objection carries no more persuasive force than the first: arbitrators are
often international legal experts, and their written awards are no less
reasoned and detailed than judicial opinions.!2"
Fourth, one can make powerful arguments to preempt the "arbitration
as contract" attack on res judicata and collateral estoppel. The central
policy behind preclusion involves fairness and the fact that arbitration
grows out of an agreement between concerned parties actually enables
121. See Motomura, supra note 30, at 36 ("As a rule, those who sponsor or conduct
arbitration(s) have considerable discretion to adopt procedures that they deem appropriate. While
some arbitrations are elaborate, more typically they are less formal than court litigation.").
122. See Biren, supra note 30, at 1055-56:
The first alternative requires the arbitrator to decide the technical issue of when
to apply collateral estoppel. This is unsatisfactory for several reasons. To begin
with, the arbitrator would be bound to make the determination in accordance [with
generally accepted criteria]. This decision may well be beyond the competence
of the arbitrator who generally is not required to possess legal skills... Further,
such a requirement is inconsistent with the arbitral process because the arbitrator
is not bound by rules of law unless the parties state that he should be....
123. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 116, at 6-18 (identifying and discussing preclusion
standards in the United States, England, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark).
124. "While not all international arbitrations are conducted under the auspices of arbitral
institutions, the overwhelming majority are." Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional
Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International
Arbitrations, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, *2 n.125 (2003). Even ad hoc arbitrations are governed by
some type of rules, often those of an institution. Id. at *2 n.126.
125. See Hulbert, supra note 2, at 183, n.165. "[B]etween ninety and ninety-five percent of
the sole arbitrators and chairmen appointed by the ICC have legal training...."
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rather than disables a line of reasoning in favor of application. In other
words, because parties have such a great measure of control over
arbitration (they select the rules, the arbitrators and the forum), it is not
unfair for them to be bound by the decisions that they so extensively
shaped.
126
Now that the differences between international and domestic arbitration
have been discussed, it is time to look more closely at how preclusion
actually works in the international setting. As discussed earlier, the case
of an arbitral award potentially binding a subsequent arbitration is an
interesting and not uncommon one. Moreover, such a case inherently
raises most-if not quite all-issues and objections that would appear in
any context (i.e., litigation-arbitration, arbitration-litigation, arbitration-
arbitration).,2 7 A lack of recognition does not, however, make the logic in
favor of preclusion any less persuasive; rather, it suggests that the national
system in question should reconsider its position.
A. Are International Arbitral Findings Binding on U.S. Courts?
1. The Question of Arbitrability
In the international arena, the preclusive force of arbitral awards is
most often debated in two circumstances, jurisdictional and substantive.
The jurisdictional issue arises when one party attempts to invoke a federal
court's subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm an award and the other party
opposes on the ground that the arbitral panel lacked authority to render the
award. 12  This essentially presents a two-part argument: Does the
126. See Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look atArticles Vand VII of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37 TEx. INT'L L.J.
43, 44 (2002) ("Because arbitration is contractual, it affords the parties the flexibility to tailor the
process to suit their mutual objectives... the key to arbitration is simply the freedom of contract.").
127. I use the qualifier "most" rather than the absolute "all," because there are certain
technical difficulties that cannot be resolved solely within the international arbitration community.
I am thinking particularly of the case where a national legal system does not recognize a particular
type of preclusion. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Robert C. Casad, Issue
Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IowA L. REV. 53, 55-56, 62-70
(1984). For example, Germany does not give preclusive effect to findings of fact or law. See
Motomura, supra note 30, at 78. See also GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE AND CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 322 (Charles E. Stewart trans., 2001) (stating that "j]udgments have legal force only
to such extent as they decide the demand raised by the complaint or counterclaim." Given the
omission of language specifying otherwise, it seems evident that German civil procedural laws only
give preclusive effect to claims or demands rather than findings of fact or law as well).
128. See, e.g., Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2004)
(dismissing arbitration award given that the proponent of award failed to meet agreernent-in-writing
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Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
require a party seeking confirmation to show that the award was rendered
pursuant to a written agreement to arbitrate? If so, is a federal district court
bound by an arbitral panel's determination that the parties agreed to
arbitrate?'29 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note with respect to the
first question that courts have indeed required a party seeking confirmation
to show-as a jurisdictional prerequisite-an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate. 130 Satisfying this standard becomes more complicated when the
party seeking confirmation does not produce an agreement-in-writing, but,
rather, an arbitralfinding of an agreement. A pair of recent circuit-court
decisions carefully examines this issue and holds that an arbitral finding
of arbitrability should be subject to at least minimal review.
In China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., a
dispute arose between a New Jersey corporation and a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the People's Republic of China. ' 3'
By the time of the dispute, the parties disagreed about every salient feature
of their relationship. 32 They could not, for example, agree whether a
transaction between them was for the sale of goods or a currency
conversion or whether they had entered a written or oral contract. 33 At
some point, Minmetals initiated an arbitration against Chi Mei before the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) pursuant to arbitration clauses in the sale of goods contracts.'34
Chi Mei appeared in the arbitration but repeatedly objected to the
tribunal's jurisdiction on the ground that the contracts containing the
arbitration clauses were forged. 3 The panel ultimately rejected Chi Mei's
forgery defense and awarded Minmetals over $4 million. 36 A U.S. District
Court confirmed the award without opinion and an appeal to the Third
Circuit ensued.1
37
The primary issue on appeal was whether a district court may properly
enforce a foreign arbitral award where the arbitral panel rejected a party's
requirement to establish court's jurisdiction); China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi
Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2003).
129. See, e.g., Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1286.
130. Id. at 1292 (holding that a party seeking confirmation must demonstrate agreement-in-
writing "to establish the district court's subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award.").
131. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 276-77.
132. Id. at 277.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 277-78.
135. Id. at 278.
136. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 278.
137. Id.
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arguments that the documents providing for arbitration were forgeries and,
consequently, there was no valid writing expressing an intent to
arbitrate."' As the Third Circuit saw it, this issue rested on two distinct
questions:
First, we must consider whether a foreign arbitration award might
be enforceable regardless of the validity of the arbitration clause on
which the foreign body rested its jurisdiction. In this regard,
Minmetals points out that the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention") differs
somewhat from the general provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), and particularly argues that Article V of the
Convention requires enforcement of foreign awards in all but a
handful of very limited circumstances, one of which is not the
necessity for there to be a valid written agreement providing for
arbitration. If we conclude, however, that only those awards based
on a valid agreement to arbitrate are enforceable, we also must
consider who makes the ultimate determination of the validity of
the clause at issue. Thus, in considering the second question, we
must examine the district court's role, if any, in reviewing the
foreign arbitral panel's finding that there was a valid agreement to
arbitrate.1
39
The first question is not particularly relevant, but the Court reviewed
the language and structure of the Convention to determine whether lack of
a valid agreement to arbitrate is a ground for declining to enforce an
award, even though that ground is not enumerated in Article V of the
138. Id. at 279. This situation is to be contrasted with that in which there is no dispute as to
the agreement to arbitrate but there is a dispute as to the existence of an underlying, substantive
contract. See Europcar Italia, S.P.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1998):
Maiellano has apparently confused the issue of a fraudulently obtained
arbitration agreement or award, which might violate public policy and therefore
preclude enforcement with the issue of whether the underlying contract that is the
subject of the arbitrated dispute was forged or fraudulently induced-a matter to
be determined exclusively by the arbitrators.
See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding
that the validity of underlying agreement, as opposed to arbitration clause at issue, was to be
decided by arbitrator).
139. China Minmentals, 334 F.3d at 279.
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Convention." The Court concluded that it is, even though "Consistently
with the policy favoring enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, courts
strictly have limited defenses to enforcement to the defenses set forth in
Article V of the Convention, and generally have construed those
exceptions narrowly."''
The Court seemed to believe that its principal task was to determine
"whether the culture of international arbitration, which informs the
structure, history, and policy of the Convention, provides a basis for
distinguishing this case from First Options," in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that-under the FAA-a district court, not an arbitration panel,
must decide the question of arbitrability.' 2 According to the Third Circuit,
If this case had arisen under the domestic FAA, First Options
clearly would have settled in Chi Mei's favor both the question of
the need for a valid agreement to arbitrate and the question of the
district court's role in reviewing an arbitrator's determination of
arbitrability when an award is sought to be enforced. 43
The Court therefore looked at the "international posture" of the case for
reasons that might remove it from the ambit of First Options.'" Paramount
among those international policies is the rule of competence-competence,
which gives arbitrators the power to pass on their own jurisdiction. 45
This rule-also known as kompetenz-kompetenz-has traditionally
held greater currency on the stage of international arbitration than of
domestic arbitration." Indeed, "international arbitration rules normally
140. Id. at 280.
141. Id. at 283.
142. Id. at 281, 284. See also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48
(1995). Some have noted a certain "tension" between the First Options rule and the holding of
Prima Paint, which held that a claim of fraudulent inducement that goes to the validity of a contract
containing an arbitration clause is a matter for the arbitrator. See Guang Dong Light Headgear
Factory Co. v. ACI Int'l, Inc., No. 03-41 65-JAR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8810, at *27-28 (D. Kan.
May 10, 2005).
143. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 281.
144. Id. at 287. Many observers are convinced that the differences between domestic and
international arbitration are so profound that the United States should consider separate regimes for
reviewing international and domestic awards. See Park, supra note 117, at 1306 (stating that, for
example, the domestic doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law" might be misapplied in the
international setting. As such, bifurcated models from France and Switzerland, for instance, could
serve as useful models for the United States).
145. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 287.
146. Id.
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provide explicitly that the arbitrators have the power to determine their
own jurisdiction;" therefore, agreements incorporating the rules of
particular arbitral bodies qualify as an exception to First Options.'4 The
rules of CIETAC-under whose auspices the China Minmetals-Chi Mei
arbitration took place-allow arbitrators to determine their jurisdiction.
48
But the. court concluded that the analysis would not end with this point
because "incorporation of this rule into the contract is relevant only if the
parties actually agreed to its incorporation."'49 Here, of course, Chi Mei
argued that the contract was forged, so the Court went on to consider
"whether international norms favoring competence-competence, as well
as American policy favoring arbitration particularly strongly in
international cases, are sufficient to render First Options inapplicable in
the international context."' 50
The Court reviewed several nations' views of competence-competence,
as well as the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law and found:
It therefore seems clear that international law overwhelmingly
favors some form of judicial review of an arbitral tribunal's
decision that it has jurisdiction over a dispute, at least where the
challenging party claims that the contract on which the tribunal
rested its jurisdiction was invalid. International norms of
competence-competence are therefore not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in First Options, at least insofar as the
holding is applied in a case where, as here, the party resisting
enforcement alleges that the contract on which arbitral jurisdiction
was founded is and always has been void. 5'
Less than a year after the China Minmetals decision, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted its rationale and affirmed a district court's refusal "to
accept at face value [an] arbitration panel's finding" that the parties had
agreed to arbitrate. 5 2 This largely parallels the China Minmetals Court's
147. Id. (quoting IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL, IV FEDERAL ARBrRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS,
AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 44.15.1 (Supp. 1996)).
148. Id. at 288.
149. Id.
150. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d at 288.
151. Id. at 289.
152. Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1293 (1 1th Cir. 2004). Lower
courts are also following China Minmetals. See, e.g., Guang Dong Light Headgear Factory Co. v.
ACI Int'l, Inc., No. 03-41 65-JAR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8810, at *29 (D. Kan. May 10, 2005)
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recognition that a court may revisit arbitrability even though "an arbitral
tribunal already has rendered a decision, and has made explicit findings
concerning the alleged forgery of the contract, including the arbitration
clause."'5 3 In light of these factual findings, one of the most dissatisfying
aspects of both opinions is the failure to even mention preclusion. That is,
even if the courts were correct that enforcement of a foreign award may be
avoided by challenging the existence of a valid arbitration clause,'54 one
is left to wonder why neither court considered the wisdom of
reexamining-on jurisdictional grounds-issues that had been fully and
fairly decided in arbitrations. With respect to judgments, "there emerges
the general rule that a judgment is entitled to full faith and credit-even as
to questions of jurisdiction-when the second court's inquiry discloses
that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided
in the court which rendered the original judgment."'
155
(holding that the Court should make an independent determination of contract's validity, "and
therefore the arbitrability of this dispute.").
153. China Minmetals, 334 F.3d 274 at 282. The Second Circuit recently reached the same
conclusion, albeit by a slightly different route. Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d
Cir. 2005). The Czarina court, for instance, held that-to invoke a federal district court's subject-
matter jurisdiction-a party must produce evidence of an agreement to arbitrate that would satisfy
Article II of the Convention. Czarina, 358 F.3d at 1290-92 (holding that a party seeking
confirmation must comply with agreement-in-writing requirement of Article II of the Convention
for the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction). The Oracle court specifically rejected this
approach. Oracle, 404 F.3d at 660. Moreover, in the Second Circuit's view, tie international
overlay of the arbitration before it was unimportant. But see Baker Marine (Nig.), Ltd. v. Chevron
(Nig.), Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[M]echanical application of domestic arbitral
law to foreign awards under the Convention would seriously undermine finality and regularly
produce conflicting judgments.") This is so because:
[First] Article V(2) of the Convention provides that a United States court is not
required to enforce an [arbitration] agreement... if enforcement of the arbitral
award would be contrary to American public policy ... [second] [Flederal
arbitration law controls in deciding this issue, [third] ... [u]nder American law,
whether a party has consented to arbitrate is an issue to be decided by the Court
in which enforcement of an award is sought, [and] the Court decides, based on
general principles of domestic contract law, whether the parties agreed to submit
the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrators.
Sarhank Group, 404 F.3d at 661 (citing First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)).
154. See Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe
fact that Slaney suggests there is no written agreement to arbitrate, as mandated by Article II of the
New York Convention is irrelevant."); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us,
Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 25 (2d Cir. 1997) ('[Tlhe state may refuse to enforce the award only on the
grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the Convention.").
155. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (Supreme Court finding that fully litigated
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2. The Preclusive Force of an Award
Any discussion of the preclusive force of a foreign arbitral award on a
U.S. court must start with the "Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards" (Convention).5 6 As one very thoughtful
court has recently observed, a decision whether to recognize a foreign
arbitral award turns on two related inquiries.157 First, what does the
Convention dictate? Second, how do the doctrine of res judicata and
notions of international comity come into play?' The case is paradigmatic
in several respects, and thus worthy of close consideration.
Gulf Petro arose out of a dispute over a joint venture between the
plaintiff, a Texas corporation, and the defendant, a Nigerian national
petroleum company, the purpose of which was to reclaim and salvage
petroleum that the Nigerian company discarded in connection with its
daily operations.' 9 The joint venture did not work out as planned and the
Texas corporation filed a demand and claim for arbitration with the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Geneva. ' ° After some delay, the
arbitration commenced; by agreement, the arbitration was bifurcated into
liability and damages phases.'6' The Texas corporation prevailed in the
liability phase, which resulted in a Partial Award in its favor.62 But on the
last day of the damages phase, the Nigerian company challenged the Texas
corporation's standing, arguing that the Texas corporation was formed
jurisdictional issues in Nebraska court precluded Missouri court from further inquiries).
156. 21 U.S.T. 2517, implemented by, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2005).
157. GulfPetro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D.
Tex. 2003), aff'd, 115 Fed. Appx. 201 (5th Cir. 2004).
158. Id. at 792; see also Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp.
907,914 (1996). The Court held that the Egyptian court's decision nullifying arbitration award did
not have res judicata effect:
The question is whether this court should give res judicata effect to the decision
of the Egyptian Court of Appeal, not whether that court properly decided the
matter under Egyptian law. Since the "act of state doctrine" as a whole does not
require U.S. courts to defer to a foreign sovereign on these facts, comity, which
is but one of several "policies" that underlie the act of state "doctrine," does not
require such deference either.
Id. (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)).
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after the execution of the joint venture and demand for arbitration. 3 The
arbitration panel agreed, and held in its Final Award that the plaintiff "did
not have standing or capacity to make and/or to sustain the claims against
[the defendant].""'
The Texas corporation appealed the Final Award to the Federal Court
in Switzerland, which "issued a decision rejecting [plaintiff's] arguments
for canceling the Final Award and, in so doing, upheld the Panel's
determination that [plaintiff] lacked standing to maintain its claims.' 15
The plaintiff subsequently brought an action in the Northern District of
Texas to confirm the Partial Award and to ignore the Final Award and
later judgment of the Swiss court confirming the Final Award.'"
The district court began its analysis by considering whether it had the
power to set aside or modify the Final Award.'67 It first looked to the
Convention, under which "a foreign court is empowered to enter one of
two judgments when faced with an arbitral award issued in another nation:
(1) enforce the award, or (2) refuse to enforce the award upon specified
conditions."'6 Given this statutory stricture, the court concluded that the
Convention "precludes a foreign court from setting aside or modifying an
arbitral award."' 69 It reached this conclusion with principal reliance on
163. Id. at 786.
164. GulfPetro, 288 F. Supp. at 786.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 792.
168. Id.
169. GuifPetro, 288 F. Supp. at 792; see also United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, implemented by, 9 U.S.C. § 201
(2005):
Article III
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award
is relied upon under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on
the recognition or enforcement ofarbitral awards to which this Convention applies
than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
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YusufAhmedAlghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., in which the Second
Circuit found:
[T]hat the Convention mandates very different regimes for the
review of arbitral awards (1) in the state in which, or under the law
of which, the award was made, and (2) in other states where
recognition and enforcement are sought. The Convention
specifically contemplates that the state in which, or under the law
of which, the award is made, will be free to set aside or modify an
award in accordance with its domestic arbitral law and its full
panoply of express and implied grounds for relief. See Convention
art. V(1)(e). However, the Convention is equally clear that when an
action for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state may
refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth
in Article V of the Convention.1
70
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment ofthe arbitrator or ofthe arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may
be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country, or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
170. 126 F.3d 15, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1997); See also Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2003) ("'the country in
which, or under the [arbitration] law of which, [an] award was made' is said to have primary
jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All other signatory States are secondary jurisdictions, in
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The court also seemed to find it persuasive (1) that the relationship
between the parties did not involve U.S. domestic law (e.g., the contract
provided for Swiss arbitration under Nigerian law). 7 and (2) that the Fifth
Circuit had recently admonished district courts to refrain from meddling
in foreign arbitrations.'72 But ultimately, the court's decision can be read
as one based onpolicy, not statutory construction: "a practice of modifying
or amending a foreign arbitral award, which has been upheld by foreign
court, could disrupt the reliability of international arbitration established
under the Convention over four decades. To rule otherwise would
encourage forum shopping among countries willing to modify or amend
arbitration awards."'73
The next step in the court's analysis was to consider whether the Partial
Award was enforceable in light of the Final Award and the Swiss
judgment. Although the court did not note the issue, this scenario suggests
that determining the preclusive effect of a court-confirmed or court-
vacated award quickly collapses into a discussion of the preclusive effects
of a foreign judgment.74 Accordingly, the court framed its discussion in
terms of the res judicata effects of foreign judgments, and the doctrine's
roots in notions of international comity. Under this rubric,
[A] foreign court's determination of a matter is conclusive in a
federal court where:
(1) the foreign judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction, which had jurisdiction over the cause and parties; (2)
the judgment is supported by due allegations and proof; (3) the
relevant parties had an opportunity to be heard; and (4) the foreign
court follows civilized procedural rules.'"
which parties can only contest whether that State should enforce the arbitral award.") (quoting New
York Convention) (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
171. Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793
(N.D. Tex. 2003).
172. Id. ("[I]t is not the district court's burden... to protect [a party] from all the legal
hardships it might undergo in a foreign country as a result of this foreign arbitration or the
international commercial dispute that spawned it.").
173. Id. (citing Baker Marine (Nig.), Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.), Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1999)) (suggesting that the "mechanical application of domestic arbitral law to foreign awards
under the Convention would seriously undermine finality and regularly produce conflicting
judgments.").
174. See Sudol, supra note 112, nn.59-60. (discussing relevant cases). For thorough
discussions of this mechanism, see, e.g., Foreign Judgments Based on Foreign Arbitral Awards:
The Applicability ofRes Judicata, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 223 (1975); see also Casad, supra note 127.
175. GulfPetro Trading, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,205-06
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On the facts presented (i.e., with evidence of a court of competent
jurisdiction, pleadings, proof and a record thereof, and opportunity to be
heard, and use of civilized procedural rules) the court held that res judicata
and international comity barred the complaint. 176
B. Are International Arbitral Awards Binding in a
Subsequent Arbitration?
The final permutation to be considered involves an arbitral award's
preclusive effect on a subsequent arbitration. The questions that spring
from the arbitration context are not wholly distinct from those discussed
in relation to the other contexts. In fact, one might usefully characterize
the analytical paradigm for evaluating this relationship as a conflation of
the paradigms described above.
In international commercial arbitration, there is often an elaborate
interplay of arbitral awards and court rulings that one must sort out to
determine what is preclusive-and against whom. 7 7 Nicor Int'l Corp. v.
(1895)). Hilton is considered a landmark case regarding the recognition and enforcement offoreign
judgments. It offers two key foundations: 1) the grounds for non-recognition of a foreign judgment
such as lack of due process, personal or subject matter jurisdiction, insufficient notice, etc., all of
which have been codified in statutes and decisions and 2) the basis for recognizing foreign
judgments founded on international comity. Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 716 (2003).
176. Id. at 794-95. See also Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (1992)
(finding that because "Avco was 'unable to present [its] case' within the meaning of Article
V(1)(b), and enforcement of the Award was properly denied."). In an unusual turn, the GulfPetro
plaintiffs later alleged in a separate suit that they had been victims of arbitral corruption. This case
was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Gulf Petro Trading Co., Inc. v. Nigerian Nat'l
Petroleum Corp., Case No. 1:05CV619 (E.D. Tex.) (Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Mar.
15, 2006).
177. Although it is beyond the scope of the matter at hand, the question of whether third
parties may be bound by arbitral findings is worth a brief mention. One recurring scenario involves
the "vouching" of a putative indemnitor into a proceeding. Vouching is a common-law device
whereby a defendant notifies the "vouchee" of a proceeding, asserts a right to indemnity, tenders
the right to defend and puts the vouchee on notice that it will be bound by factual determinations
necessary to the original judgment. Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131,
1138 (5th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit has held that a vouchee can be bound by arbitral findings,
even if it does not appear in the arbitration:
A district court, in the exercise of its discretion, may preclude relitigation of issues
previously determined in an arbitration if the court finds, under the facts of that
case, that the arbitral procedures afforded due process, that the requirements of
offensive collateral estoppel are met, and that the case raises no federal interests
warranting special protection. Further, a putative indernitor may be vouched into
an arbitration, and may suffer issue-preclusive effects from arbitral findings under
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El Paso Corp. "8 is representative of this complexity. This case arose out
of dispute concerning a professional services agreement (PSA) between
Coastal Corporation (later merged into El Paso Corp.), a Texas-based,
diversified energy holding company, and Nicor, a Panamanian consulting
company.'79 Under the PSA, Nicor was to provide consulting services for
energy-related projects in the Dominican Republic. 80 At some point,
Coastal pursued projects in the Dominican Republic through CEEP, a
company in which Coastal had an ownership interest."'m Nicor claimed that
this activity breached the PSA, and so informed Coastal.'82 Soon
thereafter, Nicor assigned its rights to Carib, which was a fifty-percent
owner of Nicor.'83 Litigation and arbitration quickly followed.'
First, Carib (Nicor's assignee) filed suit against Coastal and its
subsidiaries.'85 The Dominican nisi prius court ruled that it had no
jurisdiction in light of the broad arbitration clause in the PSA. 186 However,
an intermediate appellate court "'repealed' the lower court's judgment,
based, in part, on a finding that Coastal had 'renounced' arbitration."'8 7 The
Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic subsequently dismissed
Coastal's appeal. 188 As Carib's litigation worked its way through the
Dominican courts, Coastal instituted a parallel ICC arbitration, which
initially resulted in "finding[s] that Coastal had not waived its right to
arbitrate and that [the arbitrator] had jurisdiction to hear the parties'
dispute."'8 9 Later, the arbitrator issued a Final Award holding that Coastal
had not breached the PSA and that it was entitled to fees and costs.' 9
Undaunted, Carib pushed forward with its Dominican litigation, which
the offensive collateral estoppel rules peculiar to vouching, if the indemnitor
declines to appear in the arbitration. But offensive collateral estoppel is not
available as a matter of law on any issue that was tainted by conflict of interest
between the putative indemnitor and indemnitee in the arbitration.
Id. at 1139, 1142.
178. 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
179. Id. at 1361.
180. Id. at 1362.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Nicor, 292 F. Supp. at 1362.
184. Id. at 1362-63.
185. Id. at 1362.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Nicor, 292 F. Supp. at 1362.
189. Id. at 1362-63.
190. Id. at 1363.
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resulted in a "sentence" in favor of Carib/Nicor. 9' Under the terms of the
sentence, Carib/Nicor submitted a "statement of damages" to which
Coastal offered no response. 92 Still later, "El Paso filed a 'Request to
Grant Exequatur to a Foreign Arbitration Award' in the Dominican
Republic Court."'" The Dominican courts denied that petition. 1
After concluding their respective forays into the Dominican courts and
the ICC arbitration, Carib/Nicor filed suit in the Southern District of
Florida against El Paso/Coastal seeking, among other things, to
domesticate the Dominican judgment. 195 Coastal counterclaimed to
confirm the arbitration award.' 9 The court began with an analysis of the
Dominican "sentence."' 97 It first concluded that the sentence-even if
coupled with Nicor's "Statement of Damages"--did not qualify as a
"judgment" entitled to recognition under Florida's version of the Uniform
Out-of-Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act because it did not
award a specific "sum of money."'9' The court also paused to consider
whether the Dominican appellate court's finding that Coastal had waived
its right to arbitrate precluded the arbitrator from reaching an inconsistent
result on that issue.'"9 The Court concluded-for two reasons, one legal,
one factual-that collateral estoppel did not debar the arbitrator from
reexamining the waiver. First, the court noted that
[T]he law in this circuit is that a res judicata defense is to be raised
and decided by the arbitrator in the first instance; and that only if
the arbitrator ignores the defense would it then be appropriate for
the court to vacate an arbitration award. Notably, although not
addressed yet in this circuit, other courts have held that the res
judicata effect of a foreign judgment is similarly an issue for the
arbitrator to resolve.' 0
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Nicor, 292 F. Supp. at 1363.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1361.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1364-71.
198. Nicor, 292 F. Supp. at 1367. The Court also noted that it need not recognize the sentence
because it was entered in derogation of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Id. See also Florida's
Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 55.602 (2005)
(stating in part that "'[f]oreign judgment' means any judgment of a foreign state granting or
denying recovery of a sum ofmoney, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine, or other penalty.").
199. Nicor, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
200. Id. at 1369 (citing In re Arbitration between South Ionian Shipping Co. v. Hugh Neu &
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Second, as a factual matter, the court concluded that "the record
evidence is clear that the Sole Arbitrator did not disregard the Dominican
court's ruling. Indeed, the Sole Arbitrator premised its finding that Coastal
did not waive arbitration on 'all the facts' and 'procedural steps' of the
parties." '' Once the court satisfied itself that the arbitrator's decision on
waiver was not precluded, the court turned to the related question of
whether that decision was itself preclusive. 2 The court found that "the
arbitration proceeding afforded the parties the basic elements of an
adjudicatory procedure" and that, therefore, "the Sole Arbitrator's
resolution of the issue of waiver precludes this Court from resurrecting
it."20
3
Although the Nicor court had much to sort out, the situation can be
even more complicated. In Amco v. Indonesia,2' an International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) tribunal was called upon
to decide the preclusive reach of three layers of arbitral awards. This
arbitration arose out of a 1968 contract between Amco and Indonesia for
the construction of the Kartika Plaza Hotel. The investment was to run for
thirty years, and to facilitate the investment, Amco (a U.S. corporation)
applied to establish a subsidiary, P.T. Amco Indonesia, under Indonesian
Sons Int'l Sales Corp., 545 F. Supp. 323, 342-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (res judicata effect of Greek
judgment is issue for arbitrator)).
201. Id. at 1369. The court also found that application of collateral estoppel on these facts
would be unfair and that there was no evidence that the precise issue of whether Nicor/Carib had
actually carried their "heavy burden" of demonstrating waiver. Id. at 1370. This latter issue is not
unique to the international context. If one tribunal's findings are made under a standard of proof
lower from that employed by a subsequent tribunal, preclusion may be inappropriate. See, e.g.,
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 113 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[C]hange in the burden of proof can render issues
in two different proceedings non-identical and thereby make collateral estoppel inappropriate.");
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982) states:
[R]elitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded . . . [where] It]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial
action than in the subsequent action ... or the adversary has a significantly
heavier burden than he had in the first action.
202. Nicor Int'l Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
203. Id. at 1371. The court also held that res judicata barred Nicor/Carib's attempt to assert
a breach of contract claim because the arbitrator had already adversely ruled on that claim. Id. at
1375-76. The court did not consider whether Nicor/Carib's remaining claims were barred under
either claim or issue preclusion; rather, it found that each of those claims failed as a matter of law.
Id. at 1376-78.
204. 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. 92 (1989).
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law.2°' The application contained an arbitration clause that referred all
disputes to ICSID. As the tribunal characterized the facts:
On 31 March-1 April 1980, the hotel was allegedly seized in an
armed military action, and the management effectively taken over
by P.T. Wisma, owner of the land on which the hotel was built.
Subsequently, the investment license was revoked by the
Indonesian Capital Investment Coordination Board (BKPM), which
found that P.T. Aeropacific rather than P.T. Amco Indonesia had
carried out P.T. Amco's obligation to manage the hotel, and that
P.T. Amco Indonesia had not contributed the full sum promised in
its application for an investment license and in the Lease and
Management Contract with P.T. Wisma. Further, the Lease and
Management Contract was rescinded by the Jakarta Court in an
action initiated by P.T. Wisma against P.T. Amco Indonesia.' 6
Amco then filed a request for arbitration with ICSID (Panel 1),
disputing the right of the Indonesian government to seize the investment
and terminate the license.2°7 Ultimately, Amco was awarded $3.2 million
dollars plus interest. However, this award was annulled "as a whole" by an
Ad Hoc ICSID tribunal (Panel 2), a decision that did not extend to the
original arbitrators' finding that the armed seizure of the hotel was
illegal."' The instant tribunal (Panel 3) was forced, therefore, to sort
out-as a preliminary matter-the preclusive effects of both the original
arbitration and the ad hoc annulment.
As its first order of business, the Panel 3 tribunal had to establish a
general approach to res judicata (in the broad sense). This tribunal noted
that
205. Id. at 93.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 94. The final paragraph of the Panel 2 decision held that:
The ad hoc committee by unanimous decision annuls the award as a whole for the
reasons and with the qualifications set out above. The annulment does not extend
to the tribunal's findings that the action of the Army and Police personnel on 31
March- I April 1980 was illegal. The annulment extends, however, to the findings
on the duration of such illegality and on the amount of the indemnity due on this
account ....
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There is no quarrel between the parties with Professor Reisman's
(who had apparently submitted a written opinion to the tribunal)
view that when an ad hoc committee issues a qualified nullification
of an award rendered by an ICSID tribunal, a subsequent tribunal,
initiated by the claim of one or both of the original parties, must
treat the unannulled parts of the award as binding on the parties and
res judicata and hear relitigation of and decide only those parts
which were nullified by the ad hoc committee.2
Panel 3 immediately recognized, however, that a general rule was of
limited use in this case, not because it was difficult to decide which parts
of the Panel 1 award were unannulled, but because Indonesia asked that the
Panel 2 decision be considered barred by res judicata, not only as to the
dispositif but to the reasoning leading to the dispositif as well.2 '
Indonesia's tactic here was to minimize the preclusive effect of Panel I by
throwing a cloud over Panel l's findings; that is, if Panel 2's findings were
given preclusive effect, then they might be said to preempt Panel l's
findings. Thus, the problem is
[W]hether reasons of the ad hoc committee are to be treated as res
judicata, even if that has the effect of rendering annulled parts of
the Award as effectively closed off from redetermination,
notwithstanding that the normal effect of a partial annulment is to
place the "parties in the legal position in which they stood before
the commencement of the proceedings which gave rise to the award
which has been impeached."'
Panel 3 was comfortable with what we would think of as collateral
estoppel.212 The tribunal went on to review relevant principles of
international law and concluded that "it is by no means clear that the basic
trend in international law is to accept reasoning, preliminary or incidental
determinations as part of what constitutes res judicata. 2"3 Panel 3's
209. Amco, 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. at 96.
210. Id. at 96-97. ("dispositif--i.e., the "operative part" of an award).
211. Id. at 98 (citations omitted).
212. "The general principle, announced in numerous cases is that a right, question, or &ct
distinctly put in issue and distinctly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground
of recovery, cannot be disputed," but issue preclusion does not dispose of the question concerning
reasoning. Id. at 99.
213. Id.
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assessment of the situation finds further support in the very nature of a
Panel 2-type proceeding:
Occasionally states have agreed to submit the question whether an
arbitral award was void to a second ad hoc tribunal. In such a case,
the second tribunal sits as a court of cassation rather than of appeal.
It may only uphold or quash the award, in whole or in part; it
cannot substitute findings of its own." 4
Ultimately, the Panel 3 tribunal made a well-founded decision that
serves the interests of fairness to both parties:
" Matters sought by a party to be annulled by the ad hoc
committee, but expressly not annulled, or expressly confirmed,
are res judicata.
" Matters decided by the first tribunal but never put forward for
annulment are binding on the parties and cannot be relitigated.
This is not because, as Indonesia suggests... such matters are
implicitly confirmed by the ad hoc committee and are therefore
binding, but simply because, never having been before the ad
hoc committee, they remain binding as res judicata of the first
tribunal. However, it follows from the present tribunal's general
approach to resjudicata that, while unchallenged findings of the
first tribunal will constitute res judicata, not every incidental
statement or procedural ruling made by the first tribunal is to be
treated as a finding to which this principle applies.
* Matters expressly annulled can therefore be relitigated.
* As indicated above, the present tribunal is unable to accept the
very broad view of res judicata, whereby matters said to be
'integral' to nullity decisions [sic] of the ad hoc committee are
said to be binding, even if the conclusion to which they lead is
the striking down of a prior finding by the tribunal and a
rehearing upon such prior findings."'
This decision-both in its general and specific pronouncements-seems
to balance quite well the policy reasons that weigh in favor of preclusion
with a studied respect for diverse legal traditions. It ultimately serves,
214. Amco, 14 Y.B. COM. ARB. at 101 (citing J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL Fox, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 259 (1959)).
215. Id. at 102-03 (citation omitted).
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therefore, as an effective model for preclusion in all commercial
arbitration-domestic or international.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To facilitate the uniform application of both claim and issue preclusion
in international commercial arbitration, there are measures that arbitral
institutions, states, and parties can take to regularize the application of
preclusion in common situations. First, states could specifically address
preclusion in their arbitration acts. 216 In the Netherlands, for instance, the
Arbitration Act specifically provides for preclusion:
Resjudicata of the award
1. Only a final or partial final arbitral award is capable of acquiring
the force of res judicata. The award shall have such force from the
day on which it is made.
2. If, however, an appeal to a second arbitral tribunal is provided
for, the final or partial final award shall have the force of res
judicata from the day on which the time limit for lodging the appeal
has lapsed or, if the appeal has been lodged, the day on which a
decision is rendered on appeal, if and to the extent that the award
rendered at first instance is affirmed on appeal.217
As an alternative, a state could include a rule in its rules or code of civil
procedure that comprehends the preclusive effect of arbitral awards. The
Swedish Rattegfngsbalk, for instance, "includes a basic prescription
concerning the significance of ajudgment in future controversies.""t 8 And
although the relevant statute facially speaks only of judgments, courts
apply it to arbitral awards as well.219 Interestingly, the Swedish system
216. Even in the European Union, member-state preclusion rules remain vital. Indeed, contrary
to the usual logic, they can trump Community law. See Case C- 126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd.
v. Benetton Int'l NV, 2000 5 C.M.L.R. 816, 838 (stating that an interim award that acquires the
force of res judicata under domestic rules may no longer be called into question by a subsequent
arbitration award, even if this is necessary to examine, in proceedings for annulment of a
subsequent arbitration award, whether an agreement which the interim award held to be valid in
law is nevertheless void under Article 81 EC (ex Article 85) [a competition law]).
217. WETBOEKVANBURGERLuKERECHTSVoRDERNG [Rv.] art. 1059 (Neth.); seealso 15 YB.
COM. ARB. 56 (1990).
218. RUTHBADERGINSBURG&ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIViLPROCEDUREINSWEDEN 305 (Hans
Smit ed., 1965).
219. Id. at 306 n.525.
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does not recognize collateral estoppel in all situations; it requires, rather,
that an issue to be precluded be "red flagged" by presenting a separate
demand for a declaratory judgment on the issue.220 This dual system within
which res judicata and collateral estoppel are covered by different rules is
probably unnecessary, though workable. The wiser course would be to
bring both doctrines within the same general framework.
Second, arbitral institutions could likewise make provisions in their
procedural rules that would put parties on notice that preclusion could
affect both claims and issues in dispute.22 The mere existence of these
rules might provide the added benefit of encouraging disputants to
consolidate related claims and to attempt to join related parties. At the very
least, such rules would enhance the uniformity of decision-making,
thereby lending stability to an area that is now in flux. Like it or not, the
question of whether to preclude will continue to pop up in international
commercial arbitration, and justice is probably best served when the rules
of the game are relatively fixed and known to all.
Third, states could-if they have not already done so-bifurcate their
arbitration acts into "domestic" and "international" components. 22 As one
commentator has aptly suggested, "An optimum legal framework for
international arbitrations would limit court scrutiny to narrow review
standards, regardless of whatever judicially administered anti-abuse
measures might be appropriate for domestic cases.""223 In practice, this
would allow a loser to challenge gross procedural unfairness (e.g.,
corruption), but not the particular merits of an award.
Finally, parties have considerable latitude in determining whether an
award is to be preclusive and-in somejurisdictions-whether it is subject
to expanded review.224 In essence, a lawyer drafting an arbitration clause
is presented with an opportunity to choose the shape of an eventual award:
220. Id. at 307.
221. Although the rules of many arbitral institutions provide that awards shall be "binding"
or "final," they might be amended more clearly to mandate that the subject matter of the award
cannot be relitigated. See Interim Report, supra note 117, at 22 (discussing particular associations'
rules). Thus, by incorporating specific rules in an arbitration clause, a stronger argument could be
made that the parties intended each proceeding to be preclusive.
222. One reason some nations have been hesitant to develop separate legal frameworks for
domestic and international arbitration is fear "that such distinctions conflict with treatyprohibitions
on nationality-based discrimination." See William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International
Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805,822 (1999).
223. Park, supra note 117, at 1269.
224. See, e.g., Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating
that because parties can customize their arbitration agreements, as a result, they can "expand
judicial review of an arbitration award beyond the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act.").
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one that is conclusive or one that is subject to review. This requires a
balancing of interests-the relative speed and economy of arbitration
versus the procedural safeguards of judicial review. Plainly, this is an
inquiry that must be individually tailored. But in resolving the issues a
drafter would be wise to heed the warning of one former Magistrate Judge:
"Nominal winners in litigation are often real losers in terms of the costs
and time expended in the matter."225
225. Pamela Tynes, The Art of Drafting Arbitration Agreements, TExAs LAW., May 2, 2005,
at 35 (discussing the tailoring of arbitration agreements to expand scope ofjudicial review).
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